

**EVALUATION OF THE STASSEN PROPOSAL OF 9 MAY FROM  
AN INTELLIGENCE TARGETS REQUIREMENTS POINT OF VIEW**

I. Collection of information in the areas proposed by Mr. Stassen for aerial inspection and "ground controls" may be directed to several objectives - warning of surprise attack, solution of requirements for strategic intelligence on long range intentions and capabilities, and supervision of international disarmament. Lists of targets to satisfy each of these purposes would overlap considerably but would not be entirely identical. The number of locations for which coverage would be necessary would probably be the greatest in connection with disarmament and the least in connection with early warning.

II. The Stassen proposals go a long way towards providing opportunities for determining the state of Soviet military capabilities and hostile intentions. The proposals for aerial inspection and ground control particularly in the Arctic, include important potential staging areas for intercontinental bomber operations. Supplementing this system of combined controls with the system of "ground controls" only in the additional areas suggested by Mr. Stassen, would, provided the "ground controls" permitted a real assessment of strengths and deployment, permit coverage of areas of significance to the build-up of forces - ground, naval and air - for a surprise attack. Furthermore the present deployment of a major portion of Soviet ground, naval and air forces in these areas would permit some supervision of disarmament processes. (See attached map and table of Soviet military strength and deployment.)

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A total of 35 targets in the USSR have been determined from the standpoint of strategic needs, as having the highest priority for aerial reconnaissance (See map). These 35 targets are all related to one or more of three categories of essential intelligence needs--

- a) Status of the Soviet guided missile effort;
- b) Production, deployment, and strength of the Soviet Long Range Air Force; and
- c) Production and stockpiles of nuclear weapons

Six of the 35 targets fit the missile category; 20 are bomber facilities; and nine relate to the nuclear program.

We have about 200 other targets of high priority (i.e., important but not essential) in the USSR (See map). These additional targets cover seven categories of intelligence--

- a) Installations associated with the long-range bomber program;
- b) Soviet air defense capabilities;
- c) Atomic energy installations;
- d) Guided missile installations;
- e) Naval facilities;
- f) Industrial and communications complexes; and
- g) Positioning and capabilities of Soviet ground forces.

From the point of view of satisfying these strategic intelligence needs, it should be noted that the areas proposed include 14 of the 35 highest priority targets in the USSR and 115 of the approximately 200 high priority targets. (See table attached.)

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The fact that the majority of important targets could be covered would suggest a significant degree of protection of our national interests. This might be so quantitatively. Qualitatively, however, we would still be at a disadvantage. Fourteen of the fifteen targets of highest priority within the areas covered by the Stassen proposals are related solely to Soviet long range bomber strength and deployment. We would thus remain reliant upon other less definitive information collection mechanisms for information concerning Soviet capabilities for surprise attack from within the denied areas and also concerning several major categories of activity knowledge of which is essential to our national security. None of the most important targets related to Soviet guided missile development, nuclear weapons production and long range bomber production would be in the areas for either aerial inspection or ground control.

(For a detailed analysis of the Stassen proposals by area and type of coverage see appendix and table attached).